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Abstract
The existence of a coalition strategy to achieve a goal does not neces-
sarily mean that the coalition has enough information to know how to fol-
low the strategy. Neither does it mean that the coalition knows that such
a strategy exists. The article studies an interplay between the distributed
knowledge, coalition strategies, and coalition “know-how” strategies. The
main technical result is a sound and complete trimodal logical system that
describes the properties of this interplay.
1 Introduction
An agent a comes to a fork in a road. There is a sign that says that one of
the two roads leads to prosperity, another to death. The agent must take the
fork, but she does not know which road leads where. Does the agent have a
strategy to get to prosperity? On one hand, since one of the roads leads to
prosperity, such a strategy clearly exists. We denote this fact by modal formula
Sap, where statement p is a claim of future prosperity. Furthermore, agent a
knows that such a strategy exists. We write this as KaSap. Yet, the agent does
not know what the strategy is and, thus, does not know how to use the strategy.
We denote this by ¬Hap, where know-how modality Ha expresses the fact that
agent a knows how to achieve the goal based on the information available to
her. In this article we study the interplay between modality K, representing
knowledge, modality S, representing the existence of a strategy, and modality H,
representing the existence of a know-how strategy. Our main result is a complete
trimodal axiomatic system capturing properties of this interplay.
1.1 Epistemic Transition Systems
In this article we use epistemic transition systems to capture knowledge and
strategic behavior. Informally, epistemic transition system is a directed labeled
graph supplemented by an indistinguishability relation on vertices. For instance,
our motivational example above can be captured by epistemic transition system
T1 depicted in Figure 1. In this system state w represents the prosperity and
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Figure 1: Epistemic transition system T1.
state w′ represents death. The original state is u, but it is indistinguishable by
the agent a from state v. Arrows on the diagram represent possible transitions
between the states. Labels on the arrows represent the choices that the agents
make during the transition. For example, if in state u agent chooses left (L)
road, she will transition to the prosperity state w and if she chooses right (R)
road, she will transition to the death state w′. In another epistemic state v,
these roads lead the other way around. States u and v are not distinguishable
by agent a, which is shown by the dashed line between these two states. In
state u as well as state v the agent has a strategy to transition to the state
of prosperity: u  Sap and v  Sap. In the case of state u this strategy is
L, in the case of state v the strategy is R. Since the agent cannot distinguish
states u and v, in both of these states she does not have a know-how strategy
to reach prosperity: u 1 Hap and v 1 Hap. At the same time, since formula Sap
is satisfied in all states indistinguishable to agent a from state u, we can claim
that u  KaSap and, similarly, v  KaSap.
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Figure 2: Epistemic transition system T2.
As our second example, let us consider the epistemic transition system T2
obtained from T1 by swapping labels on transitions from v to w and from v to
w′, see Figure 2. Although in system T2 agent a still cannot distinguish states
u and v, she has a know-how strategy from either of these states to reach state
w. We write this as u  Hap and v  Hap. The strategy is to choose L. This
strategy is know-how because it does not require to make different choices in
the states that the agent cannot distinguish.
2
1.2 Imperfect Recall
For the next example, we consider a transition system T3 obtained from system
T1 by adding a new epistemic state s. From state s, agent a can choose label
L to reach state u or choose label R to reach state v. Since proposition q is
satisfied in state u, agent a has a know-how strategy to transition from state s
to a state (namely, state u) where q is satisfied. Therefore, s  Haq.
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Figure 3: Epistemic transition system T3.
A more interesting question is whether s  HaHap is true. In other words,
does agent a know how to transition from state s to a state in which she knows
how to transition to another state in which p is satisfied? One might think that
such a strategy indeed exists: in state s agent a chooses label L to transition to
state u. Since there is no transition labeled by L that leads from state s to state
v, upon ending the first transition the agent would know that she is in state
u, where she needs to choose label L to transition to state w. This argument,
however, is based on the assumption that agent a has a perfect recall. Namely,
agent a in state u remembers the choice that she made in the previous state. We
assume that the agents do not have a perfect recall and that an epistemic state
description captures whatever memories the agent has in this state. In other
words, in this article we assume that the only knowledge that an agent possesses
is the knowledge captured by the indistinguishability relation on the epistemic
states. Given this assumption, upon reaching the state u (indistinguishable from
state v) agent a knows that there exists a choice that she can make to transition
to state in which p is satisfied: s  HaSap. However, she does not know which
choice (L or R) it is: s 1 HaHap.
1.3 Multiagent Setting
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Figure 4: Epistemic transition system T4.
So far, we have assumed that only agent a has an influence on which transi-
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tion the system takes. In transition system T4 depicted in Figure 4, we introduce
another agent b and assume both agents a and b have influence on the transi-
tions. In each state, the system takes the transition labeled D by default unless
there is a consensus of agents a and b to take the transition labeled C. In such
a setting, each agent has a strategy to transition system from state u into state
w by voting D, but neither of them alone has a strategy to transition from state
u to state w′ because such a transition requires the consensus of both agents.
Thus, u  Sap∧Sbp∧¬Saq∧¬Sbq. Additionally, both agents know how to tran-
sition the system from state u into state w, they just need to vote D. Therefore,
u  Hap ∧ Hbp.
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Figure 5: Epistemic transition system T5.
In Figure 5, we show a more complicated transition system obtained from
T1 by renaming label L to D and renaming label R to C. Same as in transition
system T4, we assume that there are two agents a and b voting on the system
transition. We also assume that agent a cannot distinguish states u and v while
agent b can. By default, the system takes the transition labeled D unless there
is a consensus to take transition labeled C. As a result, agent a has a strategy
(namely, vote D) in state u to transition system to state w, but because agent a
cannot distinguish state u from state v, not only does she not know how to do
this, but she is not aware that such a strategy exists: u  Sap∧¬Hap∧¬KaSap.
Agent b, however, not only has a strategy to transition the system from state u
to state w, but also knows how to achieve this: u  Hbp.
1.4 Coalitions
We have talked about strategies, know-hows, and knowledge of individual agents.
In this article we consider knowledge, strategies, and know-how strategies of
coalitions. There are several forms of group knowledge that have been studied
before. The two most popular of them are common knowledge and distributed
knowledge [8]. Different contexts call for different forms of group knowledge.
As illustrated in the famous Two Generals’ Problem [4, 11] where commu-
nication channels between the agents are unreliable, establishing a common
knowledge between agents might be essential for having a strategy.
In some settings, the distinction between common and distributed knowl-
edge is insignificant. For example, if members of a political fraction get to-
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gether to share all their information and to develop a common strategy, then
the distributed knowledge of the members becomes the common knowledge of
the fraction during the in-person meeting.
Finally, in some other situations the distributed knowledge makes more sense
than the common knowledge. For example, if a panel of experts is formed to
develop a strategy, then this panel achieves the best result if it relies on the
combined knowledge of its members rather than on their common knowledge.
In this article we focus on distributed coalition knowledge and distributed-
know-how strategies. We leave the common knowledge for the future research.
To illustrate how distributed knowledge of coalitions interacts with strategies
and know-hows, consider epistemic transition system T6 depicted in Figure 6.
In this system, agents a and b cannot distinguish states u and v while agents b
and c cannot distinguish states v and u′. In every state, each of agents a, b and
c votes either L or R, and the system transitions according to the majority vote.
In such a setting, any coalition of two agents can fully control the transitions of
the system.
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Figure 6: Epistemic transition system T6.
For example, by both voting L, agents a and b form a coalition {a, b} that
forces the system to transition from state u to state w no matter how agent
c votes. Since proposition p is satisfied in state w, we write u  S{a,b}p, or
simply u  Sa,bp. Similarly, coalition {a, b} can vote R to force the system to
transition from state v to state w. Therefore, coalition {a, b} has strategies to
achieve p in states u and v, but the strategies are different. Since they cannot
distinguish states u and v, agents a and b know that they have a strategy to
achieve p, but they do not know how to achieve p. In our notations, v 
Sa,bp ∧ Ka,bSa,bp ∧ ¬Ha,bp.
On the other hand, although agents b and c cannot distinguish states v and
u′, by both voting R in either of states v and u′, they form a coalition {b, c}
that forces the system to transition to state w where p is satisfied. Therefore,
in any of states v and u′, they not only have a strategy to achieve p, but also
know that they have such a strategy, and more importantly, they know how to
achieve p, that is, v  Hb,cp.
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1.5 Nondeterministic Transitions
In all the examples that we have discussed so far, given any state in a system,
agents’ votes uniquely determine the transition of the system. Our framework
also allows nondeterministic transitions. Consider transition system T7 depicted
in Figure 7. In this system, there are two agents a and b who can vote either C or
D. If both agents vote C, then the system takes one of the consensus transitions
labeled with C. Otherwise, the system takes the transition labeled with D. Note
that there are two consensus transitions starting from state u. Therefore, even
if both agents vote C, they do not have a strategy to achieve p, i.e., u 1 Sa,bp.
However, they can achieve p ∨ q. Moreover, since all agents can distinguish all
states, we have u  Ha,b(p ∨ q).
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Figure 7: Epistemic transition system T7.
1.6 Universal Principles
In the examples above we focused on specific properties that were either satisfied
or not satisfied in particular states of epistemic transition systems T1 through T7.
In this article, we study properties that are satisfied in all states of all epistemic
transition systems. Our main result is a sound and complete axiomatization of
all such properties. We finish the introduction with an informal discussion of
these properties.
Properties of Single Modalities Knowledge modality KC satisfies the ax-
ioms of epistemic logic S5 with distributed knowledge. Both strategic modality
SC and know-how modality HC satisfy cooperation properties [17, 18]:
SC(ϕ→ ψ)→ (SDϕ→ SC∪Dψ), where C ∩D = ∅, (1)
HC(ϕ→ ψ)→ (HDϕ→ HC∪Dψ), where C ∩D = ∅. (2)
They also satisfy monotonicity properties
SCϕ→ SDϕ, where C ⊆ D,
HCϕ→ HDϕ, where C ⊆ D.
The two monotonicity properties are not among the axioms of our logical system
because, as we show in Lemma 5 and Lemma 3, they are derivable.
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Properties of Interplay Note that w  HCϕ means that coalition C has
the same strategy to achieve ϕ in all epistemic states indistinguishable by the
coalition from state w. Hence, the following principle is universally true:
HCϕ→ KCHCϕ. (3)
Similarly, w  ¬HCϕ means that coalition C does not have the same strategy
to achieve ϕ in all epistemic states indistinguishable by the coalition from state
w. Thus,
¬HCϕ→ KC¬HCϕ. (4)
We call properties (3) and (4) strategic positive introspection and strategic neg-
ative introspection, respectively. The strategic negative introspection is one of
our axioms. Just as how the positive introspection principle follows from the
rest of the axioms in S5 (see Lemma 14), the strategic positive introspection
principle is also derivable (see Lemma 1).
Whenever a coalition knows how to achieve something, there should exist a
strategy for the coalition to achieve. In our notation,
HCϕ→ SCϕ. (5)
We call this formula strategic truth property and it is one of the axioms of our
logical system.
The last two axioms of our logical system deal with empty coalitions. First
of all, if formula K∅ϕ is satisfied in an epistemic state of our transition system,
then formula ϕ must be satisfied in every state of this system. Thus, even empty
coalition has a trivial strategy to achieve ϕ:
K∅ϕ→ H∅ϕ. (6)
We call this property empty coalition principle. In this article we assume that
an epistemic transition system never halts. That is, in every state of the system
no matter what the outcome of the vote is, there is always a next state for this
vote. This restriction on the transition systems yields property
¬SC⊥. (7)
that we call nontermination principle.
Let us now turn to the most interesting and perhaps most unexpected prop-
erty of interplay. Note that S∅ϕ means that an empty coalition has a strategy
to achieve ϕ. Since the empty coalition has no members, nobody has to vote in a
particular way. Statement ϕ is guaranteed to happen anyway. Thus, statement
S∅ϕ simply means that statement ϕ is unavoidably satisfied after any single
transition.
For example, consider an epistemic transition system depicted in Figure 8.
As in some of our earlier examples, this system has agents a and b who vote
either C or D. If both agents vote C, then the system takes one of the consensus
transitions labeled with C. Otherwise, the system takes the default transition
7
C, D
u
v
w
a u'b
p
C, D 
C, D
C, D
Figure 8: Epistemic transition system T8.
labeled with D. Note that in state v it is guaranteed that statement p will
happen after a single transition. Thus, v  S∅p. At the same time, neither
agent a nor agent b knows about this because they cannot distinguish state v
from states u and u′ respectively. Thus, v  ¬KaS∅p ∧ ¬KbS∅p.
In the same transition system T8, agents a and b together can distinguish
state v from states u and u′. Thus, v  Ka,bS∅p. In general, statement KCS∅ϕ
means that not only ϕ is unavoidable, but coalition C knows about it. Thus,
coalition C has a know-how strategy to achieve ϕ:
KCS∅ϕ→ HCϕ.
In fact, the coalition would achieve the result no matter which strategy it uses.
Coalition C can even use a strategy that simultaneously achieves another result
in addition to ϕ:
KCS∅ϕ ∧ HCψ → HC(ϕ ∧ ψ).
In our logical system we use an equivalent form of the above principle that is
stated using only implication:
HC(ϕ→ ψ)→ (KCS∅ϕ→ HCψ). (8)
We call this property epistemic determinicity principle. Properties (1), (2), (4),
(5), (6), (7), and (8), together with axioms of epistemic logic S5 with distributed
knowledge and propositional tautologies constitute the axioms of our sound and
complete logical system.
1.7 Literature Review
Logics of coalition power were developed by Marc Pauly [17, 18], who also
proved the completeness of the basic logic of coalition power. Pauly’s approach
has been widely studied in the literature [10, 23, 7, 20, 2, 3, 6]. An alternative
logical system was proposed by More and Naumov [14].
Alur, Henzinger, and Kupferman introduced Alternating-Time Temporal
Logic (ATL) that combines temporal and coalition modalities [5]. Van der
Hoek and Wooldridge proposed to combine ATL with epistemic modality to
form Alternating-Time Temporal Epistemic Logic [22]. They did not prove the
completeness theorem for the proposed logical system.
A˚gotnes and Alechina proposed a complete logical system that combines the
coalition power and epistemic modalities [1]. Since this system does not have
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epistemic requirements on strategies, it does not contain any axioms describing
the interplay of these modalities.
Know-how strategies were studied before under different names. While Jam-
roga and A˚gotnes talked about “knowledge to identify and execute a strat-
egy” [12], Jamroga and van der Hoek discussed “difference between an agent
knowing that he has a suitable strategy and knowing the strategy itself” [13].
Van Benthem called such strategies “uniform” [21]. Wang gave a complete ax-
iomatization of “knowing how” as a binary modality [25, 24], but his logical
system does not include the knowledge modality.
In our AAMAS paper, we investigated coalition strategies to enforce a condi-
tion indefinitely [15]. Such strategies are similar to “goal maintenance” strate-
gies in Pauly’s “extended coalition logic” [17, p. 80]. We focused on “exe-
cutable” and “verifiable” strategies. Using the language of the current article,
executability means that a coalition remains “in the know-how” throughout the
execution of the strategy. Verifiability means that the coalition can verify that
the enforced condition remains true. In the notations of the current article,
the existence of a verifiable strategy could be expressed as SCKCϕ. In [15],
we provided a complete logical system that describes the interplay between the
modality representing the existence of an “executable” and “verifiable” coali-
tion strategy to enforce and the modality representing knowledge. This system
can prove principles similar to the strategic positive introspection (3) and the
strategic negative introspection (4) mentioned above. A similar complete logical
system in a single-agent setting for strategies to achieve a goal in multiple steps
rather than to maintain a goal is developed by Fervari, Herzig, Li, and Wang [9].
In the current article, we combine know-how modality H with strategic
modality S and epistemic modality K. The proof of the completeness theo-
rem is significantly more challenging than in [15, 9]. It employs new techniques
that construct pairs of maximal consistent sets in “harmony” and in “complete
harmony”. See Section 6.3 and Section 6.4 for details. An extended abstract of
this article, without proofs, appeared as [16].
1.8 Outline
This article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce formal syntax
and semantics of our logical system. In Section 3 we list axioms and inference
rules of the system. Section 4 provides examples of formal proofs in our logical
systems. Proofs of the soundness and the completeness are given in Section 5
and Section 6 respectively. Section 7 concludes the article.
The key part of the proof of the completeness is the construction of a pair
of sets in complete harmony. We discuss the intuition behind this construction
and introduce the notion of harmony in Section 6.3. The notion of complete
harmony is introduced in Section 6.4.
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2 Syntax and Semantics
In this section we present the formal syntax and semantics of our logical system
given a fixed finite set of agentsA. Epistemic transition system could be thought
of as a Kripke model of modal logic S5 with distributed knowledge to which
we add transitions controlled by a vote aggregation mechanism. Examples of
vote aggregation mechanisms that we have considered in the introduction are
the consensus/default mechanism and the majority vote mechanism. Unlike
the introductory examples, in the general definition below we assume that at
different states the mechanism might use different rules for vote aggregation.
The only restriction on the mechanism that we introduce is that there should
be at least one possible transition that the system can take no matter what the
votes are. In other words, we assume that the system can never halt.
For any set of votes V , by V A we mean the set of all functions from set A
to set V . Alternatively, the set V A could be thought of as a set of tuples of
elements of V indexed by elements of A.
Definition 1 A tuple (W, {∼a}a∈A, V,M, pi) is called an epistemic transition
system, where
1. W is a set of epistemic states,
2. ∼a is an indistinguishability equivalence relation on W for each a ∈ A,
3. V is a nonempty set called “domain of choices”,
4. M ⊆ W × V A ×W is an aggregation mechanism where for each w ∈ W
and each s ∈ V A, there is w′ ∈W such that (w, s, w′) ∈M ,
5. pi is a function that maps propositional variables into subsets of W .
Definition 2 A coalition is a subset of A.
Note that a coalition is always finite due to our assumption that the set of
all agents A is finite. Informally, we say that two epistemic states are indistin-
guishable by a coalition C if they are indistinguishable by every member of the
coalition. Formally, coalition indistinguishability is defined as follows:
Definition 3 For any epistemic states w1, w2 ∈ W and any coalition C, let
w1 ∼C w2 if w1 ∼a w2 for each agent a ∈ C.
Corollary 1 Relation ∼C is an equivalence relation on the set of states W for
each coalition C.
By a strategy profile {sa}a∈C of a coalition C we mean a tuple that specifies
vote sa ∈ V of each member a ∈ C. Since such a tuple can also be viewed as
a function from set C to set V , we denote the set of all strategy profiles of a
coalition C by V C :
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Definition 4 Any tuple {sa}a∈C ∈ V C is called a strategy profile of coalition
C.
In addition to a fixed finite set of agents A we also assume a fixed countable
set of propositional variables. We use the assumption that this set is countable
in the proof of Lemma 21. The language Φ of our formal logical system is
specified in the next definition.
Definition 5 Let Φ be the minimal set of formulae such that
1. p ∈ Φ for each propositional variable p,
2. ¬ϕ,ϕ→ ψ ∈ Φ for all formulae ϕ,ψ ∈ Φ,
3. KCϕ,SCϕ,HCϕ ∈ Φ for each coalition C and each ϕ ∈ Φ.
In other words, language Φ is defined by the following grammar:
ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ→ ϕ | KCϕ | SCϕ | HCϕ.
By ⊥ we denote the negation of a tautology. For example, we can assume
that ⊥ is ¬(p→ p) for some fixed propositional variable p.
According to Definition 1, a mechanism specifies the transition that a system
might take for any strategy profile of the set of all agents A. It is sometimes
convenient to consider transitions that are consistent with a given strategy pro-
file s of a give coalition C ⊆ A. We write w →s u if a transition from state w
to state u is consistent with strategy profile s. The formal definition is below.
Definition 6 For any epistemic states w, u ∈ W , any coalition C, and any
strategy profile s = {sa}a∈C ∈ V C , we write w →s u if (w, s′, u) ∈ M for some
strategy profile s′ = {s′a}a∈A ∈ V A such that s′a = sa for each a ∈ C.
Corollary 2 For any strategy profile s of the empty coalition ∅, if there are
a coalition C and a strategy profile s′ of coalition C such that w →s′ u, then
w →s u.
The next definition is the key definition of this article. It formally specifies
the meaning of the three modalities in our logical system.
Definition 7 For any epistemic state w ∈ W of a transition system (W, {∼a
}a∈A, V,M, pi) and any formula ϕ ∈ Φ, let relation w  ϕ be defined as follows
1. w  p if w ∈ pi(p) where p is a propositional variable,
2. w  ¬ϕ if w 1 ϕ,
3. w  ϕ→ ψ if w 1 ϕ or w  ψ,
4. w  KCϕ if w′  ϕ for each w′ ∈W such that w ∼C w′,
5. w  SCϕ if there is a strategy profile s ∈ V C such that w →s w′ implies
w′  ϕ for every w′ ∈W ,
6. w  HCϕ if there is a strategy profile s ∈ V C such that w ∼C w′ and
w′ →s w′′ imply w′′  ϕ for all w′, w′′ ∈W .
11
3 Axioms
In additional to propositional tautologies in language Φ, our logical system
consists of the following axioms.
1. Truth: KCϕ→ ϕ,
2. Negative Introspection: ¬KCϕ→ KC¬KCϕ,
3. Distributivity: KC(ϕ→ ψ)→ (KCϕ→ KCψ),
4. Monotonicity: KCϕ→ KDϕ, if C ⊆ D,
5. Cooperation: SC(ϕ→ ψ)→ (SDϕ→ SC∪Dψ), where C ∩D = ∅.
6. Strategic Negative Introspection: ¬HCϕ→ KC¬HCϕ,
7. Epistemic Cooperation: HC(ϕ→ ψ)→ (HDϕ→ HC∪Dψ),
where C ∩D = ∅,
8. Strategic Truth: HCϕ→ SCϕ,
9. Epistemic Determinicity: HC(ϕ→ ψ)→ (KCS∅ϕ→ HCψ),
10. Empty Coalition: K∅ϕ→ H∅ϕ,
11. Nontermination: ¬SC⊥.
We have discussed the informal meaning of these axioms in the introduction. In
Section 5 we formally prove the soundness of these axioms with respect to the
semantics from Definition 7.
We write ` ϕ if formula ϕ is provable from the axioms of our logical system
using Necessitation, Strategic Necessitation, and Modus Ponens inference rules:
ϕ
KCϕ
ϕ
HCϕ
ϕ, ϕ→ ψ
ψ
.
We write X ` ϕ if formula ϕ is provable from the theorems of our logical system
and a set of additional axioms X using only Modus Ponens inference rule.
4 Derivation Examples
In this section we give examples of formal derivations in our logical system. In
Lemma 1 we prove the strategic positive introspection principle (3) discussed
in the introduction. The proof is similar to the proof of the epistemic positive
introspection principle in Lemma 14.
Lemma 1 ` HCϕ→ KCHCϕ.
12
Proof. Note that formula ¬HCϕ→ KC¬HCϕ is an instance of Strategic Negative
Introspection axiom. Thus, ` ¬KC¬HCϕ → HCϕ by the law of contrapositive
in the propositional logic. Hence, ` KC(¬KC¬HCϕ → HCϕ) by Necessitation
inference rule. Thus, by Distributivity axiom and Modus Ponens inference rule,
` KC¬KC¬HCϕ→ KCHCϕ. (9)
At the same time, KC¬HCϕ→ ¬HCϕ is an instance of Truth axiom. Thus,
` HCϕ → ¬KC¬HCϕ by contraposition. Hence, taking into account the fol-
lowing instance of Negative Introspection axiom ¬KC¬HCϕ → KC¬KC¬HCϕ,
one can conclude that ` HCϕ → KC¬KC¬HCϕ. The latter, together with
statement (9), implies the statement of the lemma by the laws of propositional
reasoning. 
In the next example, we show that the existence of a know-how strategy by a
coalition implies that the coalition has a distributed knowledge of the existence
of a strategy.
Lemma 2 ` HCϕ→ KCSCϕ.
Proof. By Strategic Truth axiom, ` HCϕ → SCϕ. Hence, ` KC(HCϕ → SCϕ)
by Necessitation inference rule. Thus, ` KCHCϕ → KCSCϕ by Distributivity
axiom and Modus Ponens inference rule. At the same time, ` HCϕ→ KCHCϕ
by Lemma 1. Therefore, ` HCϕ→ KCSCϕ by the laws of propositional reason-
ing. 
The next lemma shows that the existence of a know-how strategy by a sub-
coalition implies the existence of a know-how strategy by the entire coalition.
Lemma 3 ` HCϕ→ HDϕ, where C ⊆ D.
Proof. Note that ϕ → ϕ is a propositional tautology. Thus, ` ϕ → ϕ. Hence,
` HD\C(ϕ → ϕ) by Strategic Necessitation inference rule. At the same time,
by Epistemic Cooperation axiom, ` HD\C(ϕ → ϕ) → (HCϕ → HDϕ) due to
the assumption C ⊆ D. Therefore, ` HCϕ→ HDϕ by Modus Ponens inference
rule. 
Although our logical system has three modalities, the system contains ne-
cessitation inference rules only for two of them. The lemma below shows that
the necessitation rule for the third modality is admissible.
Lemma 4 For each finite C ⊆ A, inference rule ϕ
SCϕ
is admissible in our
logical system.
Proof. Assumption ` ϕ implies ` HCϕ by Strategic Necessitation inference rule.
Hence, ` SCϕ by Strategic Truth axiom and Modus Ponens inference rule. 
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The next result is a counterpart of Lemma 3. It states that the existence
of a strategy by a sub-coalition implies the existence of a strategy by the entire
coalition.
Lemma 5 ` SCϕ→ SDϕ, where C ⊆ D.
Proof. Note that ϕ → ϕ is a propositional tautology. Thus, ` ϕ → ϕ. Hence,
` SD\C(ϕ → ϕ) by Lemma 4. At the same time, by Cooperation axiom,
` SD\C(ϕ → ϕ) → (SCϕ → SDϕ) due to the assumption C ⊆ D. There-
fore, ` SCϕ→ SDϕ by Modus Ponens inference rule. 
5 Soundness
In this section we prove the soundness of our logical system. The proof of the
soundness of multiagent S5 axioms and inference rules is standard. Below we
show the soundness of each of the remaining axioms and the Strategic Necessi-
tation inference rule as a separate lemma. The soundness theorem for the whole
logical system is stated at the end of this section as Theorem 1.
Lemma 6 If w  SC(ϕ→ ψ), w  SDϕ, and C ∩D = ∅, then w  SC∪Dψ.
Proof. Suppose that w  SC(ϕ→ ψ). Then, by Definition 7, there is a strategy
profile s1 = {s1a}a∈C ∈ V C such that w′  ϕ → ψ for each w′ ∈ W where
w →s1 w′. Similarly, assumption w  SDϕ implies that there is a strategy
s2 = {s2a}a∈D ∈ V D such that w′  ϕ for each w′ ∈ W where w →s2 w′. Let
strategy profile s = {sa}a∈C∪D be defined as follows:
sa =
{
s1a, if a ∈ C,
s2a, if a ∈ D.
Strategy profile s is well-defined due to the assumption C∩D = ∅ of the lemma.
Consider any epistemic state w′ ∈ W such that w →s w′. By Definition 7,
it suffices to show that w′  ψ. Indeed, assumption w →s w′, by Definition 6,
implies that w →s1 w′ and w →s2 w′. Thus, w′  ϕ → ψ and w′  ϕ by the
choice of strategies s1 and s2. Therefore, w′  ψ by Definition 7. 
Lemma 7 If w  ¬HCϕ, then w  KC¬HCϕ.
Proof. Consider any epistemic state u ∈W such that w ∼C u. By Definition 7,
it suffices to show that u 1 HCϕ. Assume the opposite. Thus, u  HCϕ. Then,
again by Definition 7, there is a strategy profile s ∈ V C where u′′  ϕ for all
u′, u′′ ∈ W such that u ∼C u′ and u′ →s u′′. Recall that w ∼C u. Thus,
by Corollary 1, u′′  ϕ for all u′, u′′ ∈ W such that w ∼C u′ and u′ →s u′′.
Therefore, w  HCϕ, by Definition 7. The latter contradicts the assumption of
the lemma. 
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Lemma 8 If w  HC(ϕ→ ψ), w  HDϕ, and C ∩D = ∅, then w  HC∪Dψ.
Proof. Suppose that w  HC(ϕ→ ψ). Thus, by Definition 7, there is a strategy
profile s1 = {s1a}a∈C ∈ V C such that w′′  ϕ→ ψ for all epistemic states w′, w′′
where w ∼C w′ and w′ →s1 w′′. Similarly, assumption w  HDϕ implies that
there is a strategy s2 = {s2a}a∈D ∈ V D such that w′′  ϕ for all w′, w′′ where
w ∼D w′ and w′ →s2 w′′. Let strategy profile s = {sa}a∈C∪D be defined as
follows:
sa =
{
s1a, if a ∈ C,
s2a, if a ∈ D.
Strategy profile s is well-defined due to the assumption C∩D = ∅ of the lemma.
Consider any epistemic states w′, w′′ ∈ W such that w ∼C∪D w′ and
w′ →s w′′. By Definition 7, it suffices to show that w′′  ψ. Indeed, by
Definition 3 assumption w ∼C∪D w′ implies that w ∼C w′ and w ∼D w′. At
the same time, by Definition 6, assumption w′ →s w′′ implies that w′ →s1 w′′
and w′ →s2 w′′. Thus, w′′  ϕ → ψ and w′′  ϕ by the choice of strategies s1
and s2. Therefore, w′′  ψ by Definition 7. 
Lemma 9 If w  HCϕ, then w  SCϕ.
Proof. Suppose that w  HCϕ. Thus, by Definition 7, there is a strategy profile
s ∈ V C such that w′′  ϕ for all epistemic states w′, w′′ ∈ W , where w ∼C w′
and w′ →s w′′. By Corollary 1, w ∼C w. Hence, w′′  ϕ for each epistemic
state w′′ ∈W , where w →s w′′. Therefore, w  SCϕ by Definition 7. 
Lemma 10 If w  HC(ϕ→ ψ) and w  KCS∅ϕ, then w  HCψ.
Proof. Suppose that w  HC(ϕ→ ψ). Thus, by Definition 7, there is a strategy
profile s ∈ V C such that w′′  ϕ→ ψ for all epistemic states w′, w′′ ∈W where
w ∼C w′ and w′ →s w′′.
Consider any epistemic states w′0, w
′′
0 ∈ W such that w ∼C w′0 and w′0 →s
w′′0 . By Definition 7, it suffices to show that w
′′
0  ψ.
Indeed, by Definition 7, the assumption w  KCS∅ϕ together with w ∼C w′0
imply that w′0  S∅ϕ. Hence, by Definition 7, there is a strategy profile s′ of
empty coalition ∅ such that w′′  ϕ for each w′′ where w′0 →s′ w′′. Thus,
w′′0  ϕ due to Corollary 2 and w′0 →s w′′0 . By the choice of strategy profile s,
statements w ∼C w′0 and w′0 →s w′′0 imply w′′0  ϕ → ψ. Finally, by Defini-
tion 7, statements w′′0  ϕ→ ψ and w′′0  ϕ imply that w′′0  ψ. 
Lemma 11 If w  K∅ϕ, then w  H∅ϕ.
Proof. Let s = {sa}a∈∅ be the empty strategy profile. Consider any epistemic
states w′, w′′ ∈W such that w ∼∅ w′ and w′ →s w′′. By Definition 7, it suffices
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to show that w′′  ϕ. Indeed w ∼∅ w′′ by Definition 3. Therefore, w′′  ϕ by
assumption w  K∅ϕ and Definition 7. 
Lemma 12 w 1 SC⊥.
Proof. Suppose that w  SC⊥. Thus, by Definition 7, there is a strategy profile
s = {sa}a∈A ∈ V C such that u  ⊥ for each u ∈W where w →s u.
Note that by Definition 1, the domain of choices V is not empty. Thus,
strategy profile s can be extended to a strategy profile s′ = {s′a}a∈A ∈ V A such
that s′a = sa for each a ∈ C.
By Definition 1, there must exist a state w′ ∈ W such that (w, s′, w′) ∈ M .
Hence, w →s w′ by Definition 6. Therefore, w′  ⊥ by the choice of strategy s,
which contradicts Definition 7. 
Lemma 13 If w  ϕ for any epistemic state w ∈W of an epistemic transition
system (W, {∼a}a∈A, V,M, pi), then w  SCϕ for every epistemic state w ∈W .
Proof. By Definition 1, set V is not empty. Let v ∈ V . Consider strategy profile
s = {sa}a∈C of coalition C such that sa = v for each s ∈ C. Note that w′  ϕ
for each w′ ∈ W due to the assumption of the lemma. Therefore, w  SCϕ by
Definition 7. 
Taken together, the lemmas above imply the soundness theorem for our
logical system stated below.
Theorem 1 If ` ϕ, then w  ϕ for each epistemic state w ∈ W of each
epistemic transition system (W, {∼a}a∈A, V,M, pi). 
6 Completeness
This section is dedicated to the proof of the following completeness theorem for
our logical system.
Theorem 2 If w  ϕ for each epistemic state w of each epistemic transition
system, then ` ϕ.
6.1 Positive Introspection
The proof of Theorem 2 is divided into several parts. In this section we prove
the positive introspection principle for distributed knowledge modality from the
rest of modality K axioms in our logical system. This is a well-known result that
we reproduce to keep the presentation self-sufficient. The positive introspection
principle is used later in the proof of the completeness.
Lemma 14 ` KCϕ→ KCKCϕ.
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Proof. Formula ¬KCϕ → KC¬KCϕ is an instance of Negative Introspection
axiom. Thus, ` ¬KC¬KCϕ→ KCϕ by the law of contrapositive in the proposi-
tional logic. Hence, ` KC(¬KC¬KCϕ → KCϕ) by Necessitation inference rule.
Thus, by Distributivity axiom and Modus Ponens inference rule,
` KC¬KC¬KCϕ→ KCKCϕ. (10)
At the same time, KC¬KCϕ→ ¬KCϕ is an instance of Truth axiom. Thus,
` KCϕ→ ¬KC¬KCϕ by contraposition. Hence, taking into account the follow-
ing instance of Negative Introspection axiom ¬KC¬KCϕ→ KC¬KC¬KCϕ, one
can conclude that ` KCϕ → KC¬KC¬KCϕ. The latter, together with state-
ment (10), implies the statement of the lemma by the laws of propositional
reasoning. 
6.2 Consistent Sets of Formulae
The proof of the completeness consists in constructing a canonical model in
which states are maximal consistent sets of formulae. This is a standard tech-
nique in modal logic that we modified significantly to work in the setting of our
logical system. The standard way to apply this technique to a modal operator2 is to create a “child” state w′ such that ¬ψ ∈ w′ for each “parent” state w
where ¬2ψ ∈ w. In the simplest case when 2 is a distributed knowledge modal-
ity KC , the standard technique requires no modification and the construction of
a “child” state is based on the following lemma:
Lemma 15 For any consistent set of formulae X, any formula ¬KCψ ∈ X,
and any formulae KCϕ1, . . . ,KCϕn ∈ X, the set of formulae {¬ψ,ϕ1, . . . , ϕn}
is consistent.
Proof. Assume the opposite. Then, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ` ψ. Thus, by the deduction
theorem for propositional logic applied n times,
` ϕ1 → (ϕ2 → . . . (ϕn → ψ) . . . ).
Hence, by Necessitation inference rule,
` KC(ϕ1 → (ϕ2 → . . . (ϕn → ψ) . . . )).
By Distributivity axiom and Modus Ponens inference rule,
KCϕ1 ` KC(ϕ2 → . . . (ϕn → ψ) . . . ).
By repeating the last step (n− 1) times,
KCϕ1, . . . ,KCϕn ` KCψ.
Hence, X ` KCψ by the choice of formula KCϕ1, . . . ,KCϕn, which contradicts
the consistency of the set X due to the assumption ¬KCψ ∈ X. 
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If 2 is the modality SC , then the standard technique needs to be modified.
Namely, while ¬SCψ ∈ w means that coalition C can not achieve goal ψ, its
pairwise disjoint sub-coalitions D1, . . . , Dn ⊆ C might still achieve their own
goals ϕ1, . . . , ϕn. An equivalent of Lemma 15 for modality SC is the following
statement.
Lemma 16 For any consistent set of formulae X, and any subsets D1, . . . , Dn
of a coalition C, any formula ¬SCψ ∈ X, and any SD1ϕ1, . . . ,SDnϕn ∈ X, if
Di ∩Dj = ∅ for all integers i, j ≤ n such that i 6= j, then the set of formulae
{¬ψ,ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} is consistent.
Proof. Suppose that ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕn ` ψ. Hence, by the deduction theorem for
propositional logic applied n times,
` ϕ1 → (ϕ2 → (. . . (ϕn → ψ) . . . )).
Then, ` SD1(ϕ1 → (ϕ2 → (. . . (ϕn → ψ) . . . ))) by Lemma 4. Hence, by Coop-
eration axiom and Modus Ponens inference rule,
` SD1ϕ1 → S∅∪D1(ϕ2 → (. . . (ϕn → ψ) . . . )).
In other words,
` SD1ϕ1 → SD1(ϕ2 → (. . . (ϕn → ψ) . . . )).
Then, by Modus Ponens inference rule,
SD1ϕ1 ` SD1(ϕ2 → (. . . (ϕn → ψ) . . . )).
By Cooperation axiom and Modus Ponens inference rule,
SD1ϕ1 ` SD2ϕ2 → SD1∪D2(. . . (ϕn → ψ) . . . ).
Again, by Modus Ponens inference rule,
SD1ϕ1,SD2ϕ2 ` SD1∪D2(. . . (ϕn → ψ) . . . ).
By repeating the previous steps n− 2 times,
SD1ϕ1,SD2ϕ2, . . . ,SDnϕn ` SD1∪D2∪···∪Dnψ.
Recall that SD1ϕ1,SD2ϕ2, . . . ,SDnϕn ∈ X by the assumption of the lemma.
Thus, X ` SD1∪D2∪···∪Dnψ. Therefore, X ` SCψ by Lemma 5. Since the set X
is consistent, the latter contradicts the assumption ¬SCψ ∈ X of the lemma. 
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Figure 9: States w′ and w′ are maximal consistent sets of formulae in complete
harmony.
6.3 Harmony
If 2 is the modality HC , then the standard technique needs even more significant
modification. Namely, as it follows from Definition 7, assumption ¬HCψ ∈ w
requires us to create not a single child of parent w, but two different children
referred in Definition 7 as states w′ and w′′, see Figure 9. Child w′ is a state of
the system indistinguishable from state w by coalition C. Child w′′ is a state
such that ¬ψ ∈ w′′ and coalition C cannot prevent the system to transition
from w′ to w′′.
One might think that states w′ and w′′ could be constructed in order: first
state w′ and then state w′′. It appears, however, that such an approach does
not work because it does not guarantee that ¬ψ ∈ w′′. To solve the issue,
we construct states w′ and w′′ simultaneously. While constructing states w′
and w′′ as maximal consistent sets of formulae, it is important to maintain two
relations between sets w′ and w′′ that we call “to be in harmony” and “to be
in complete harmony”. In this section we define harmony relation and prove
its basic properties. The next section is dedicated to the complete harmony
relation.
Even though according to Definition 5 the language of our logical system
only includes propositional connectives ¬ and →, other connectives, including
conjunction ∧, can be defined in the standard way. By ∧Y we mean the con-
junction of a finite set of formulae Y . If set Y is a singleton, then ∧Y represents
the single element of set Y . If set Y is empty, then ∧Y is defined to be any
propositional tautology.
Definition 8 Pair (X,Y ) of sets of formulae is in harmony if X 0 S∅¬ ∧ Y ′
for each finite set Y ′ ⊆ Y .
Lemma 17 If pair (X,Y ) is in harmony, then set X is consistent.
Proof. If set X is not consistent, then any formula can be derived from it. In
particular, X ` S∅¬ ∧ ∅. Therefore, pair (X,Y ) is not in harmony by Defini-
tion 8. 
Lemma 18 If pair (X,Y ) is in harmony, then set Y is consistent.
Proof. Suppose that Y is inconsistent. Then, there is a finite set Y ′ ⊆ Y such
that ` ¬∧Y ′. Hence, ` S∅¬∧Y ′ by Lemma 4. Thus, X ` S∅¬∧Y ′. Therefore,
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by Definition 8, pair (X,Y ) is not in harmony. 
Lemma 19 For any ϕ ∈ Φ, if pair (X,Y ) is in harmony, then either pair
(X ∪ {¬S∅ϕ}, Y ) or pair (X,Y ∪ {ϕ}) is in harmony.
Proof. Suppose that neither pair (X ∪ {¬S∅ϕ}, Y ) nor pair (X,Y ∪ {ϕ}) is in
harmony. Then, by Definition 8, there are finite sets Y1 ⊆ Y and Y2 ⊆ Y ∪ {ϕ}
such that
X,¬S∅ϕ ` S∅¬ ∧ Y1 (11)
and
X ` S∅¬ ∧ Y2. (12)
Formula ¬ ∧ Y1 → ¬((∧Y1) ∧ (∧(Y2 \ {ϕ}))) is a propositional tautology.
Thus, ` S∅(¬ ∧ Y1 → ¬((∧Y1) ∧ (∧(Y2 \ {ϕ})))) by Lemma 4. Then, by Co-
operation axiom, statement (11), and Modus Ponens inference rule, X,¬S∅ϕ `
S∅∪∅¬((∧Y1) ∧ (∧(Y2 \ {ϕ}))). In other words,
X,¬S∅ϕ ` S∅¬((∧Y1) ∧ (∧(Y2 \ {ϕ}))). (13)
Finally, formula ¬∧ Y2 → (ϕ→ ¬((∧Y1)∧ (∧(Y2 \ {ϕ})))) is also a proposi-
tional tautology. Thus, by Lemma 4,
` S∅(¬ ∧ Y2 → (ϕ→ ¬((∧Y1) ∧ (∧(Y2 \ {ϕ}))))).
Then, by Cooperation axiom, statement (12), and Modus Ponens inference rule,
X ` S∅(ϕ→ ¬((∧Y1)∧(∧(Y2\{ϕ})))). Thus, by Cooperation axiom and Modus
Ponens inference rule,
X ` S∅ϕ→ S∅¬((∧Y1) ∧ (∧(Y2 \ {ϕ}))).
By Modus Ponens inference rule,
X,S∅ϕ ` S∅¬((∧Y1) ∧ (∧(Y2 \ {ϕ}))).
Hence, X ` S∅¬((∧Y1)∧(∧(Y2\{ϕ}))) by statement (13) and the laws of propo-
sitional reasoning. Recall that Y1 and Y2 \{ϕ} are subsets of Y . Therefore, pair
(X,Y ) is not in harmony by Definition 8. 
The next lemma is an equivalent of Lemma 15 and Lemma 16 for modality
HC .
Lemma 20 For any consistent set of formulae X, any formula ¬HCψ ∈ X,
and any function f : C → Φ, pair (Y, Z) is in harmony, where
Y = {ϕ | KCϕ ∈ X}, and
Z = {¬ψ} ∪ {χ | ∃D ⊆ C (HDχ ∈ X ∧ ∀a ∈ D (f(a) = χ))}.
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Proof. Suppose that pair (Y,Z) is not in harmony. Thus, by Definition 8, there
is a finite Z ′ ⊆ Z such that Y ` S∅¬ ∧ Z ′. Since a derivation uses only finitely
many assumptions, there are formulae KCϕ1,KCϕ2 . . . ,KCϕn ∈ X such that
ϕ1, ϕ2 . . . , ϕn ` S∅¬ ∧ Z ′.
Then, by the deduction theorem for propositional logic applied n times,
` ϕ1 → (ϕ2 → (· · · → (ϕn → S∅¬ ∧ Z ′) . . . )).
Hence, by Necessitation inference rule,
` KC(ϕ1 → (ϕ2 → (· · · → (ϕn → S∅¬ ∧ Z ′) . . . ))).
Then, by Distributivity axiom and Modus Ponens inference rule,
` KCϕ1 → KC(ϕ2 → (· · · → (ϕn → S∅¬ ∧ Z ′) . . . )).
Thus, by Modus Ponens inference rule,
KCϕ1 ` KC(ϕ2 → (· · · → (ϕn → S∅¬ ∧ Z ′) . . . )).
By repeating the previous two steps (n− 1) times,
KCϕ1,KCϕ2 . . . ,KCϕn ` KCS∅¬ ∧ Z ′.
Hence, by the choice of formulae KCϕ1,KCϕ2, . . . ,KCϕn,
X ` KCS∅¬ ∧ Z ′. (14)
Since set Z ′ is a subset of set Z, by the choice of set Z, there must exist formulae
HD1χ1, . . . ,HDnχn ∈ X such that D1, . . . , Dn ⊆ C,
∀i ≤ n ∀a ∈ Di (f(a) = χi), (15)
and the following formula is a tautology, even if ¬ψ /∈ Z ′:
χ1 → (χ2 → . . . (χn → (¬ψ → ∧Z ′)) . . . ). (16)
Without loss of generality, we can assume that formulae χ1, . . . , χn are pairwise
distinct.
Claim 1 Di ∩Dj = ∅ for each i, j ≤ n such that i 6= j.
Proof of Claim. Suppose the opposite. Then, there is a ∈ Di ∩Dj . Thus,
χi = f(a) = χj by statement (15). This contradicts the assumption that
formulae χ1, . . . , χn are pairwise distinct. 
Since formula (16) is a propositional tautology, by the law of contrapositive,
the following formula is also a propositional tautology:
χ1 → (χ2 → . . . (χn → (¬ ∧ Z ′ → ψ)) . . . ).
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Thus, by Strategic Necessitation inference rule,
` H∅(χ1 → (χ2 → . . . (χn → (¬ ∧ Z ′ → ψ)) . . . )).
Hence, by Epistemic Cooperation axiom and Modus Ponens inference rule,
` HD1χ1 → H∅∪D1(χ2 → . . . (χn → (¬ ∧ Z ′ → ψ)) . . . ).
Then, by Modus Ponens inference rule,
HD1χ1 ` HD1(χ2 → . . . (χn → (¬ ∧ Z ′ → ψ)) . . . ).
By Epistemic Cooperation axiom, Claim 1, and Modus Ponens inference rule,
HD1χ1 ` HD2χ2 → HD1∪D2(. . . (χn → (¬ ∧ Z ′ → ψ)) . . . ).
By Modus Ponens inference rule,
HD1χ1,HD2χ2 ` HD1∪D2(. . . (χn → (¬ ∧ Z ′ → ψ)) . . . ).
By repeating the previous two steps (n− 2) times,
HD1χ1,HD2χ2, . . . ,HDnχn ` HD1∪D2∪···∪Dn(¬ ∧ Z ′ → ψ).
Recall that HD1χ1,HD2χ2, . . . ,HDnχn ∈ X by the choice of HD1χ1, . . . , HDnχn.
Thus, X ` HD1∪D2∪···∪Dn(¬ ∧ Z ′ → ψ). Hence, because D1, . . . , Dn ⊆ C, by
Lemma 3, X ` HC(¬ ∧ Z ′ → ψ). Then, X ` HCψ by Epistemic Determinicity
axiom and statement (14). Since the set X is consistent, this contradicts the
assumption ¬HCψ ∈ X of the lemma. 
6.4 Complete Harmony
Definition 9 A pair in harmony (X,Y ) is in complete harmony if for each
ϕ ∈ Φ either ¬S∅ϕ ∈ X or ϕ ∈ Y .
Lemma 21 For each pair in harmony (X,Y ), there is a pair in complete har-
mony (X ′, Y ′) such that X ⊆ X ′ and Y ⊆ Y ′.
Proof. Recall that the set of agent A is finite and the set of propositional
variables is countable. Thus, the set of all formulae Φ is also countable. Let
ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . be an enumeration of all formulae in Φ. We define two chains of sets
X1 ⊆ X2 ⊆ . . . and Y1 ⊆ Y2 ⊆ . . . such that pair (Xn, Yn) is in harmony for
each n ≥ 1. These two chains are defined recursively as follows:
1. X1 = X and Y1 = Y ,
2. if pair (Xn, Yn) is in harmony, then, by Lemma 19, either pair (Xn ∪
{¬S∅ϕn}, Yn) or pair (Xn, Yn∪{ϕn}) is in harmony. Let (Xn+1, Yn+1) be
(Xn ∪ {¬S∅ϕn}, Yn) in the former case and (Xn, Yn ∪ {ϕn}) in the latter
case.
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Let X ′ =
⋃
nXn and Y
′ =
⋃
n Yn. Note that X = X1 ⊆ X ′ and Y = Y1 ⊆ Y ′.
We next show that pair (X ′, Y ′) is in harmony. Suppose the opposite. Then,
by Definition 8, there is a finite set Y ′′ ⊆ Y ′ such that X ′ ` S∅¬ ∧ Y ′′. Since
a deduction uses only finitely many assumptions, there must exist n1 ≥ 1 such
that
Xn1 ` S∅¬ ∧ Y ′′. (17)
At the same time, since set Y ′′ is finite, there must exist n2 ≥ 1 such that
Y ′′ ⊆ Yn2 . Let n = max{n1, n2}. Note that ¬ ∧ Y ′′ → ¬ ∧ Yn is a tautology
because Y ′′ ⊆ Yn2 ⊆ Yn. Thus, ` S∅(¬ ∧ Y ′′ → ¬ ∧ Yn) by Lemma 4. Then,
` S∅¬ ∧ Y ′′ → S∅¬ ∧ Yn by Cooperation axiom and Modus Ponens inference
rule. Hence, Xn1 ` S∅¬ ∧ Yn due to statement (17). Thus, Xn ` S∅¬ ∧ Yn,
because Xn1 ⊆ Xn. Then, pair (Xn, Yn) is not in harmony, which contradicts
the choice of pair (Xn, Yn). Therefore, pair (X
′, Y ′) is in harmony.
We finally show that pair (X ′, Y ′) is in complete harmony. Indeed, consider
any ϕ ∈ Φ. Since ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . is an enumeration of all formulae in Φ, there must
exist k ≥ 1 such that ϕ = ϕk. Then, by the choice of pair (Xk+1, Yk+1), either
¬S∅ϕ = ¬S∅ϕk ∈ Xk+1 ⊆ X ′ or ϕ = ϕk ∈ Yk+1 ⊆ Y ′. Therefore, pair (X ′, Y ′)
is in complete harmony. 
6.5 Canonical Epistemic Transition System
The construction of a canonical model, called the canonical epistemic transition
system, for the proof of the completeness is based on the “unravelling” tech-
nique [19]. Informally, epistemic states in this system are nodes in a tree. In
this tree, each node is labeled with a maximal consistent set of formulae and
each edge is labeled with a coalition. Formally, epistemic states are defined
as sequences representing paths in such a tree. In the rest of this section we
fix a maximal consistent set of formulae X0 and define a canonical epistemic
transition system ETS(X0) = (W, {∼a}a∈A, V,M, pi).
Definition 10 The set of epistemic states W consists of all finite sequences
X0, C1, X1, C2, . . . , Cn, Xn, such that
1. n ≥ 0,
2. Xi is a maximal consistent subset of Φ for each i ≥ 1,
3. Ci is a coalition for each i ≥ 1,
4. {ϕ | KCiϕ ∈ Xi−1} ⊆ Xi for each i ≥ 1.
We say that two nodes of the tree are indistinguishable to an agent a if
every edge along the unique path connecting these two nodes is labeled with a
coalition containing agent a.
Definition 11 For any state w = X0, C1, X1, C2, . . . , Cn, Xn and any state
w′ = X0, C ′1, X
′
1, C
′
2, . . . , C
′
m, X
′
m, let w ∼a w′ if there is an integer k such that
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1. 0 ≤ k ≤ min{n,m},
2. Xi = X
′
i for each i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
3. Ci = C
′
i for each i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
4. a ∈ Ci for each i such that k < i ≤ n,
5. a ∈ C ′i for each i such that k < i ≤ m.
For any state w = X0, C1, X1, C2, . . . , Cn, Xn, by hd(w) we denote the set
Xn. The abbreviation hd stands for “head”.
Lemma 22 For any w = X0, C1, X1, C2, . . . , Cn, Xn ∈W and any integer k ≤
n, if KCϕ ∈ Xn and C ⊆ Ci for each integer i such that k < i ≤ n, then
KCϕ ∈ Xk.
Proof. Suppose that there is k ≤ n such that KCϕ /∈ Xk. Let m be the maximal
such k. Note that m < n due to the assumption KCϕ ∈ Xn of the lemma. Thus,
m < m+ 1 ≤ n.
Assumption KCϕ /∈ Xm implies ¬KCϕ ∈ Xm due to the maximality of
the set Xm. Hence, Xm ` KC¬KCϕ by Negative Introspection axiom. Thus,
Xm ` KCm+1¬KCϕ by Monotonicity axiom and the assumption C ⊆ Cm+1
of the lemma (recall that m + 1 ≤ n). Then, KCm+1¬KCϕ ∈ Xm due to the
maximality of the set Xm. Hence, ¬KCϕ ∈ Xm+1 by Definition 10. Thus,
KCϕ /∈ Xm+1 due to the consistency of the set Xm+1, which is a contradiction
with the choice of integer m. 
Lemma 23 For any w = X0, C1, X1, C2, . . . , Cn, Xn ∈W and any integer k ≤
n, if KCϕ ∈ Xk and C ⊆ Ci for each integer i such that k < i ≤ n, then ϕ ∈ Xn.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on the distance between n and k. In
the base case n = k. Then the assumption KCϕ ∈ Xn implies Xn ` ϕ by Truth
axiom. Therefore, ϕ ∈ Xn due to the maximality of set Xn.
Suppose that k < n. Assumption KCϕ ∈ Xk implies Xk ` KCKCϕ by
Lemma 14. Thus, Xk ` KCk+1KCϕ by Monotonicity axiom, the condition k < n
of the inductive step, and the assumption C ⊆ Ck+1 of the lemma. Then,
KCk+1KCϕ ∈ Xk by the maximality of set Xk. Hence, KCϕ ∈ Xk+1 by Defini-
tion 10. Therefore, ϕ ∈ Xn by the induction hypothesis. 
Lemma 24 If KCϕ ∈ hd(w) and w ∼C w′, then ϕ ∈ hd(w′).
Proof. The statement follows from Lemma 22, Lemma 23, and Definition 11
because there is a unique path between any two nodes in a tree. 
At the beginning of Section 6.2, we discussed that if a parent node contains
a modal formula ¬2ψ, then it must have a child node containing formula ¬ψ.
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Lemma 15 in Section 6.2 provides a foundation for constructing such a child
node for modality KC . The proof of the next lemma describes the construction
of the child node for this modality.
Lemma 25 If KCϕ /∈ hd(w), then there is an epistemic state w′ ∈W such that
w ∼C w′ and ϕ /∈ hd(w′).
Proof. Assumption KCϕ /∈ hd(w) implies that ¬KCϕ ∈ hd(w) due to the max-
imality of the set hd(w). Thus, by Lemma 15, set Y0 = {¬ϕ} ∪ {ψ | KCψ ∈
hd(w)} is consistent. Let Y be a maximal consistent extension of set Y0 and w′
be sequence w,C, Y . In other words, sequence w′ is an extension of sequence w
by two additional elements: C and Y . Note that w′ ∈ W due to Definition 10
and the choice of set Y0. Furthermore, w ∼C w′ by Definition 11. To finish the
proof, we need to show that ϕ /∈ hd(w′). Indeed, ¬ϕ ∈ Y0 ⊆ Y = hd(w′) by the
choice of Y0. Therefore, ϕ /∈ hd(w′) due to the consistency of the set hd(w′). 
In the next two definitions we specify the domain of votes and the vote
aggregation mechanism of the canonical transition system. Informally, a vote
(ϕ,w) of each agent consists of two components: the actual vote ϕ and a key
w. The actual vote ϕ is a formula from Φ in support of what the agent votes.
Recall that the agent does not know in which exact state the system is, she only
knows the equivalence class of this state with respect to the indistinguishability
relation. The key w is the agent’s guess of the epistemic state where the system
is. Informally, agent’s vote has more power to force the formula to be satisfied
in the next state if she guesses the current state correctly.
Although each agent is free to vote for any formula she likes, the vote aggre-
gation mechanism would grant agent’s wish only under certain circumstances.
Namely, if the system is in state w and set hd(w) contains formula SCϕ, then
the mechanism guarantees that formula ϕ is satisfied in the next state as long
as each member of coalition C votes for formula ϕ and correctly guesses the
current epistemic state. In other words, in order for formula ϕ to be guaranteed
in the next state all members of the coalition C must cast vote (ϕ,w). This
means that if SCϕ ∈ hd(w), then coalition C has a strategy to force ϕ in the
next state. Since the strategy requires each member of the coalition to guess
correctly the current state, such a strategy is not a know-how strategy.
The vote aggregation mechanism is more forgiving if the epistemic state w
contains formula HCϕ. In this case the mechanism guarantees that formula ϕ
is satisfied in the next state if all members of the coalition vote for formula ϕ;
it does not matter if they guess the current state correctly or not. This means
that if HCϕ ∈ hd(w), then coalition C has a know-how strategy to force ϕ in
the next state. The strategy consists in each member of the coalition voting for
formula ϕ and specifying an arbitrary epistemic state as the key.
Formal definitions of the domain of choices and of the vote aggregation
mechanism in the canonical epistemic transition system are given below.
Definition 12 The domain of choices V is Φ×W .
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For any pair u = (x, y), let pr1(u) = x and pr2(u) = y.
Definition 13 The mechanism M of the canonical model is the set of all tuples
(w, {sa}a∈A, w′) such that for each formula ϕ ∈ Φ and each coalition C,
1. if SCϕ ∈ hd(w) and sa = (ϕ,w) for each a ∈ C, then ϕ ∈ hd(w′), and
2. if HCϕ ∈ hd(w) and pr1(sa) = ϕ for each a ∈ C, then ϕ ∈ hd(w′).
The next two lemmas prove that the vote aggregation mechanism specified
in Definition 13 acts as discussed in the informal description given earlier.
Lemma 26 Let w,w′ ∈W be epistemic states, SCϕ ∈ hd(w) be a formula, and
s = {sa}a∈C be a strategy profile of coalition C. If w →s w′ and sa = (ϕ,w) for
each a ∈ C, then ϕ ∈ hd(w′).
Proof. Suppose that w →s w′. Thus, by Definition 6, there is a strategy profile
s′ = {s′a}a∈A ∈ V A such that s′a = sa for each a ∈ C and (w, s′, w′) ∈ M .
Therefore, ϕ ∈ hd(w′) by Definition 13 and the assumption sa = (ϕ,w) for each
a ∈ C. 
Lemma 27 Let w,w′, w′′ ∈W be epistemic states, HCϕ ∈ hd(w) be a formula,
and s = {sa}a∈C be a strategy profile of coalition C. If w ∼C w′, w′ →s w′′,
and pr1(sa) = ϕ for each a ∈ C, then ϕ ∈ hd(w′′).
Proof. Suppose that HCϕ ∈ hd(w). Thus, hd(w) ` KCHCϕ by Lemma 1. Hence,
KCHCϕ ∈ hd(w) due to the maximality of the set hd(w). Thus, HCϕ ∈ hd(w′)
by Lemma 24 and the assumption w ∼C w′. By Definition 6, assumption w′ →s
w′′ implies that there is a strategy profile s′ = {s′a}a∈A such that s′a = sa for
each a ∈ C and (w′, s′, w′′) ∈ M . Since HCϕ ∈ hd(w′), pr1(s′a) = pr1(sa) = ϕ
for each a ∈ C, and (w′, s′, w′′) ∈M , we have ϕ ∈ hd(w′′) by Definition 13. 
The lemma below provides a construction of a child node for modality SC .
Although the proof follows the outline of the proof of Lemma 25 for modality
KC , it is significantly more involved because of the need to show that a tran-
sition from a parent node to a child node satisfies the constraints of the vote
aggregation mechanism from Definition 13.
Lemma 28 For any epistemic state w ∈ W , any formula ¬SCψ ∈ hd(w), and
any strategy profile s = {sa}a∈C ∈ V C , there is a state w′ ∈ W such that
w →s w′ and ψ /∈ hd(w′).
Proof. Let Y0 be the following set of formulae
{¬ψ} ∪ {ϕ | ∃D ⊆ C(SDϕ ∈ hd(w) ∧ ∀a ∈ D(pr1(sa) = ϕ))}.
We first show that set Y0 is consistent. Suppose the opposite. Thus, there
must exist formulae ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈ Y0 and subsets D1, . . . , Dn ⊆ C such that (i)
SDiϕi ∈ hd(w) for each integer i ≤ n, (ii) pr1(sa) = ϕi for each i ≤ n and each
a ∈ Di, and (iii) set {¬ψ,ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} is inconsistent. Without loss of generality
we can assume that formulae ϕ1, . . . , ϕn are pairwise distinct.
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Claim 2 Sets Di and Dj are disjoint for each i 6= j.
Proof of Claim. Assume that d ∈ Di ∩Dj , then pr1(sd) = ϕi and pr1(sd) =
ϕj . Hence, ϕi = ϕj , which contradicts the assumption that formulae ϕ1, . . . , ϕn
are pairwise distinct. Therefore, sets Di and Dj are disjoint for each i 6= j. 
By Lemma 16, it follows from Claim 2 that set Y0 is consistent. Let Y be any
maximal consistent extension of Y0 and w
′ be the sequence w,∅, Y . In other
words, w′ is an extension of sequence w by two additional elements: ∅ and Y .
Claim 3 w′ ∈W .
Proof of Claim. By Definition 10, it suffices to show that, for each formula
ϕ ∈ Φ, if K∅ϕ ∈ hd(w), then ϕ ∈ Y . Indeed, suppose that K∅ϕ ∈ hd(w).
Thus, hd(w) ` H∅ϕ by Empty Coalition axiom. Hence, hd(w) ` S∅ϕ by
Strategic Truth axiom. Then, S∅ϕ ∈ hd(w) due to the maximality of set hd(w).
Therefore, ϕ ∈ Y0 ⊆ Y by the choice of sets Y0 and Y . 
Let > be any propositional tautology. For example, > could be formula
ψ → ψ. Define strategy profile s′ = {s′a}a∈A as follows
s′a =
{
sa, if a ∈ C,
(>, w), otherwise. (18)
Claim 4 For any formula ϕ ∈ Φ and any D ⊆ A, if SDϕ ∈ hd(w) and s′a =
(ϕ,w) for each a ∈ D, then ϕ ∈ hd(w′).
Proof of Claim. Consider any formula ϕ ∈ Φ and any set D ⊆ A such that
SDϕ ∈ hd(w) and s′a = (ϕ,w) for each agent a ∈ D. We need to show that
ϕ ∈ hd(w′).
Case 1: D ⊆ C. In this case, sa = s′a = (ϕ,w) for each a ∈ D by definition (18).
Thus, ϕ ∈ Y0 ⊆ Y = hd(w′) by the choice of set Y0.
Case 2: There is a0 ∈ D such that a0 /∈ C. Then, s′a0 = (>, w) by definition (18).
Note that s′a0 = (ϕ,w) by the choice of the set D. Thus, (>, w) = (ϕ,w).
Hence, formula ϕ is the tautology >. Therefore, ϕ ∈ hd(w′) because set hd(w′)
is maximal. 
Claim 5 For any formula ϕ ∈ Φ and any D ⊆ A, if HDϕ ∈ hd(w) and
pr1(s
′
a) = ϕ for each a ∈ D, then ϕ ∈ hd(w′).
Proof of Claim. Consider any formula ϕ ∈ Φ and any set D ⊆ A such that
HDϕ ∈ hd(w) and pr1(s′a) = ϕ for each agent a ∈ D. We need to show that
ϕ ∈ hd(w′).
Case 1: D ⊆ C. In this case, pr1(sa) = pr1(s′a) = ϕ for each agent a ∈ D by
definition (18) and the choice of set D. Thus, ϕ ∈ Y0 ⊆ Y = hd(w′) by the
choice of set Y0.
Case 2: There is agent a0 ∈ D such that a0 /∈ C. Then, s′a0 = (>, w) by
definition (18). Note that pr1(s
′
a0) = ϕ by the choice of set D. Thus, > = ϕ.
27
Hence, formula ϕ is the tautology >. Therefore, ϕ ∈ hd(w′) because set hd(w′)
is maximal. 
By Definition 13, Claim 4 and Claim 5 together imply that (w, s′, w′) ∈M .
Hence, w →s w′ by Definition 6 and definition (18). To finish the proof
of the lemma, note that ψ /∈ hd(w′) because set hd(w′) is consistent and
¬ψ ∈ Y0 ⊆ Y = hd(w′). 
The next lemma shows the construction of a child node for modality HC . The
proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 28 except that, instead of constructing a
single child node, we construct two sibling nodes that are in complete harmony.
The intuition was discussed at the beginning of Section 6.3.
Lemma 29 For any state w ∈W , any formula ¬HCψ ∈ hd(w), and any strat-
egy profile s = {sa}a∈C ∈ V C , there are epistemic states w′, w′′ ∈ W such that
ψ /∈ hd(w′′), w ∼C w′, and w′ →s w′′.
Proof. By Definition 12, for each a ∈ C, vote sa is a pair. Let
Y = {ϕ | KCϕ ∈ hd(w)}, and
Z = {¬ψ} ∪ {ϕ | ∃D ⊆ C (HDϕ ∈ hd(w) ∧ ∀a ∈ D (pr1(sa) = ϕ))}.
By Lemma 20 where f(x) = pr1(sx), pair (Y,Z) is in harmony. By Lemma 21,
there is a pair (Y ′, Z ′) in complete harmony such that Y ⊆ Y ′ and Z ⊆ Z ′. By
Lemma 17 and Lemma 18, sets Y ′ and Z ′ are consistent. Let Y ′′ and Z ′′ be
maximal consistent extensions of sets Y ′ and Z ′, respectively.
Recall that set A is finite. Thus, set C ⊆ A is also finite. Let integer n be
the cardinality of set C. Consider (n + 1) sequences w1, w2, . . . , wn+1, where
sequence wk is an extension of sequence w that adds 2k additional elements:
w1 = w,C, Y
′′
w2 = w,C, Y
′′, C, Y ′′
w3 = w,C, Y
′′, C, Y ′′, C, Y ′′
. . .
wn+1 = w,C, Y
′′, . . . , C, Y ′′︸ ︷︷ ︸
2(n+1) elements
.
Claim 6 wk ∈W for each k ≤ n+ 1.
Proof of Claim. We prove the claim by induction on integer k.
Base Case: By Definition 10, it suffices to show that if KCϕ ∈ hd(w), then
ϕ ∈ hd(w1). Indeed, if KCϕ ∈ hd(w), then ϕ ∈ Y by the choice of set Y .
Therefore, ϕ ∈ Y ⊆ Y ′ ⊆ Y ′′ = hd(w1).
Induction Step: By Definition 10, it suffices to show that if KCϕ ∈ hd(wk),
then ϕ ∈ hd(wk+1) for each k ≥ 1. In other words, we need to prove that if
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KCϕ ∈ Y ′′, then ϕ ∈ Y ′′, which follows from Truth axiom and the maximality
of set Y ′′. 
By the pigeonhole principle, there is i0 ≤ n such that pr2(sa) 6= wi0 for all
a ∈ C. Let w′ be epistemic state wi0 . Thus,
pr2(sa) 6= w′ for each a ∈ C. (19)
Let w′′ be the sequence w,∅, Z ′′. In other words, sequence w′′ is an extension
of sequence w by two additional elements: ∅ and Z ′′. Finally, let strategy profile
s′ = {s′a}a∈A be defined as follows
s′a =
{
sa, if a ∈ C,
(>, w′), otherwise. (20)
Claim 7 w′′ ∈W .
Proof of Claim. By Definition 10, it suffices to show that if K∅ϕ ∈ hd(w),
then ϕ ∈ hd(w′′) for each formula ϕ ∈ Φ. Indeed, by Empty Coalition axiom,
assumption K∅ϕ ∈ hd(w) implies that hd(w) ` H∅ϕ. Hence, H∅ϕ ∈ hd(w) by
the maximality of the set hd(w). Thus, ϕ ∈ Z by the choice of set Z. Therefore,
ϕ ∈ Z ⊆ Z ′ ⊆ Z ′′ = hd(w′′). 
Claim 8 w ∼C w′.
Proof of Claim. By Definition 11, w ∼C wi for each integer i ≤ n + 1. In
particular, w ∼C wi0 = w′. 
Claim 9 ψ /∈ hd(w′′).
Proof of Claim. Note that ¬ψ ∈ Z by the choice of set Z. Thus, ¬ψ ∈ Z ⊆
Z ′ ⊆ Z ′′ = hd(w′′). Therefore, ψ /∈ hd(w′′) due to the consistency of the set
hd(w′′). 
Claim 10 Let ϕ be a formula in Φ and D be a subset of A. If SDϕ ∈ hd(w′)
and s′a = (ϕ,w
′) for each a ∈ D, then ϕ ∈ hd(w′′).
Proof of Claim. Note that either set D is empty or it contains an element
a0. In the latter case, element a0 either belongs or does not belong to set C.
Case I: D = ∅. Recall that pair (Y ′, Z ′) is in complete harmony. Thus, by
Definition 9, either ¬S∅ϕ ∈ Y ′ ⊆ Y ′′ = hd(w′) or ϕ ∈ Z ′ ⊆ Z ′′ = hd(w′′).
Assumption SDϕ ∈ hd(w′) implies that ¬S∅ϕ /∈ hd(w′) due to the consistency
of the set hd(w′) and the assumption D = ∅ of the case. Therefore, ϕ ∈ hd(w′′).
Case II: there is an element a0 ∈ C ∩D. Thus, a0 ∈ C. Hence, pr2(sa0) 6= w′
by inequality (19). Then, sa0 6= (ϕ,w′). Thus, s′a0 6= (ϕ,w′) by definition (20).
Recall that a0 ∈ C ∩D ⊆ D. This contradicts the assumption that s′a = (ϕ,w′)
for each a ∈ D.
Case III: there is an element a0 ∈ D \C. Thus, s′a0 = (>, w′) by definition (20).
At the same time, s′a0 = (ϕ,w
′) by the second assumption of the claim. Hence,
formula ϕ is the propositional tautology >. Therefore, ϕ ∈ hd(w′′) due to the
maximality of the set hd(w′′). 
29
Claim 11 Let ϕ be a formula in Φ and D be a subset of A. If HDϕ ∈ hd(w′)
and pr1(s
′
a) = ϕ for each a ∈ D, then ϕ ∈ hd(w′′).
Proof of Claim.
Case I: D ⊆ C. Suppose that pr1(s′a) = ϕ for each a ∈ D and HDϕ ∈ hd(w′).
Thus, ϕ ∈ Z by the choice of set Z. Therefore, ϕ ∈ Z ⊆ Z ′ ⊆ Z ′′ = hd(w′′).
Case II: D * C. Consider any a0 ∈ D \ C. Note that s′a0 = (>, w′) by
definition (20). At the same time, pr1(s
′
aa) = ϕ by the second assumption
of the claim. Hence, formula ϕ is the propositional tautology >. Therefore,
ϕ ∈ hd(w′′) due to the maximality of the set hd(w′′). 
Claim 10 and Claim 11, by Definition 13, imply that (w′, {s′a}a∈A, w′′) ∈M .
Thus, w′ →s w′′ by Definition 6 and definition (20). This together with Claim 6,
Claim 7, Claim 8, and Claim 9 completes the proof of the lemma. 
Definition 14 pi(p) = {w ∈W | p ∈ hd(w)}.
This concludes the definition of tuple (W, {∼a}a∈A, V,M, pi).
Lemma 30 Tuple (W, {∼a}a∈A, V,M, pi) is an epistemic transition system.
Proof. By Definition 1, it suffices to show that for each w ∈W and each s ∈ V A
there is w′ ∈W such that (w, s, w′) ∈M .
Recall that set A is finite. Thus, ` ¬SA⊥ by Nontermination axiom. Hence,
¬SA⊥ ∈ hd(w). By Lemma 28, there is w′ ∈W such that w →s w′. Therefore,
(w, s, w′) ∈M by Definition 6. 
Lemma 31 w  ϕ iff ϕ ∈ hd(w) for each epistemic state w ∈ W and each
formula ϕ ∈ Φ.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on the structural complexity of formula
ϕ. If formula ϕ is a propositional variable, then the required follows from
Definition 7 and Definition 14. The cases of formula ϕ being a negation or an
implication follow from Definition 7, and the maximality and the consistency of
the set hd(w) in the standard way.
Let formula ϕ have the form KCψ.
(⇒) Suppose that KCψ /∈ hd(w). Then, by Lemma 25, there is w′ ∈ W such
that w ∼C w′ and ψ /∈ hd(w′). Hence, w′ 1 ψ by the induction hypothesis.
Therefore, w 1 KCψ by Definition 7.
(⇐) Assume that KCψ ∈ hd(w). Consider any w′ ∈W such that w ∼C w′. By
Definition 7, it suffices to show that w′  ψ. Indeed, ψ ∈ hd(w′) by Lemma 24.
Therefore, by the induction hypothesis, w′  ψ.
Let formula ϕ have the form SCψ.
(⇒) Suppose that SCψ /∈ hd(w). Then, ¬SCψ ∈ hd(w) due to the maximality
of the set hd(w). Hence, by Lemma 28, for any strategy profile s ∈ V C , there
is an epistemic state w′ ∈W such that w →s w′ and ψ /∈ hd(w′). Thus, by the
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induction hypothesis, for any strategy profile s ∈ V C , there is a state w′ ∈ W
such that w →s w′ and w′ 1 ψ. Then, w 1 SCψ by Definition 7.
(⇐) Assume that SCψ ∈ hd(w). Consider strategy profile s = {sa}a∈C ∈ V C
such that sa = (ψ,w) for each a ∈ C. By Lemma 26, for any epistemic state
w′ ∈ W , if w →s w′, then ψ ∈ hd(w′). Hence, by the induction hypothesis, for
any epistemic state w′ ∈ W , if w →s w′, then w′  ψ. Therefore, w  SCψ by
Definition 7.
Finally, let formula ϕ have the form HCψ.
(⇒) Suppose that HCψ /∈ hd(w). Then, ¬HCψ ∈ hd(w) due to the maximality
of the set hd(w). Hence, by Lemma 29, for any strategy profile s ∈ V C , there
are epistemic states w′, w′′ ∈W such that w ∼C w′, w′ →s w′′, and ψ /∈ hd(w′′).
Thus, w′′ 1 ψ by the induction hypothesis. Therefore, w 1 HCψ by Definition 7.
(⇐) Assume that HCψ ∈ hd(w). Consider a strategy profile s = {sa}a∈C ∈ V C
such that sa = (ψ,w) for each a ∈ C. By Lemma 27, for all epistemic states
w′, w′′ ∈ W , if w ∼C w′, and w′ →s w′′, then ψ ∈ hd(w′′). Hence, by the
induction hypothesis, w′′  ψ. Therefore, w  HCψ by Definition 7. 
6.6 Completeness: the Final Step
To finish the proof of Theorem 2 stated at the beginning of Section 6, suppose
that 0 ϕ. Let X0 be any maximal consistent subset of set Φ such that ¬ϕ ∈
X0. Consider the canonical epistemic transition system ETS(X0) defined in
Section 6.5. Let w be the single-element sequence X0. Note that w ∈ W by
Definition 10. Thus, w  ¬ϕ by Lemma 31. Therefore, w 1 ϕ by Definition 7.
7 Conclusion
In this article we proposed a sound and complete logic system that captures an
interplay between the distributed knowledge, coalition strategies, and how-to
strategies. In the future work we hope to explore know-how strategies of non-
homogeneous coalitions in which different members contribute differently to the
goals of the coalition. For example, “incognito” members of a coalition might
contribute only by sharing information, while “open” members also contribute
by voting.
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